There are nights I watch the Celtics and wonder if the coaching staff is allowed to say the words, “Maybe we should try something else.”
A player takes a three. Misses. The next guy takes one early in the clock. Misses. A lead that felt comfortable five minutes ago is suddenly single digits, and the answer seems to be to run the exact same operation and hope the next shot goes in.
I don't hate three-point shooting. I'd be an idiot to hate three-point shooting. It's a huge part of how Boston won the 2024 championship. What drives me nuts is the feeling that the approach becomes a commandment even after the game in front of the coach has changed.
In March 2023, after the Celtics blew a 28-point lead to Brooklyn, Joe Mazzulla said that three-point attempt rate was the most important statistic in basketball. Not three-point percentage—attempt rate, the share of shots taken from outside. It was a revealing statement about how he saw Brooklyn's ability to erase a deficit. Contemporaneous Boston.com reporting.
Fine. It's important. But it's not a cheat code. Three-point attempt rate tells me where a team shoots, not whether the possession was good. It won't explain a bad closeout, a missed box-out or a team spending seven minutes without a made field goal. It doesn't tell me whether an open layup was passed up so someone could feel virtuous about an extra three-point attempt.
The numbers look different when you count the losses.
Boston went 64–18 in 2023–24, 61–21 in 2024–25 and 56–26 in 2025–26. The Celtics attempted 42.5, 48.2 and 42.1 threes per game, respectively. Their three-point percentages were 38.8, 36.8 and 36.7. Those are good teams, and the title counts. Mazzulla deserves credit for it. Basketball-Reference team seasons.
But consider the 2025 Knicks series. Boston blew 20-point leads in both Games 1 and 2. Across the two losses the Celtics took 100 threes and made 25. In Game 1 they attempted an NBA-playoff-record 60; in Game 2 they went more than eight minutes without a fourth-quarter field goal. If your best possession after the opponent adjusts is another contested attempt from 27 feet, we have a coaching problem worth discussing. NBA's Game 1 analysis and Game 2 recap.
There's no statistic that proves Mazzulla ordered every bad shot. Players make decisions. Some of those threes were good looks. But a coach's responsibility doesn't end at approving the original game plan. When it stops producing, you can change the pace, hunt the rim, involve a different screener or make the defense foul you. I want to know which things Boston actually tried—not whether Mazzulla still liked the spreadsheet after the game.
The following spring was worse. Boston led Philadelphia 3–1, then lost three straight and went out 109–100 in Game 7 at TD Garden. Tatum missed that final game with knee discomfort, an important piece of context. It doesn't explain away Games 5 and 6. Philadelphia crowded the arc, and Boston made 29% of its threes over those two games as its shot profile changed. NBA's Game 6 tactical breakdown and NBA Game 7 record.
I don't want to burn a basketball team down every time a jumper misses. I want a reason to believe the coach has an answer when a good defense takes away what he likes.
About that two-for-one.
The two-for-one at the end of a quarter has been making me crazy for years. Thirty-six seconds left. The offense scrambles into some miserable pull-up because it wants the ball back. I keep thinking: why not get one genuinely good shot instead of rushing for two?
Then I looked at a real analysis, and the results weren't what I expected.
In August, analyst Nate Mekonen examined 778 potential two-for-one sequences from the 2025–26 NBA regular season and playoffs. His method counted 582 quick-shot attempts and 196 cases where teams slowed down. The quick-shot sequences averaged 2.16 points across the sequence, compared with 1.47 when teams passed on the two-for-one. Even the initial quick shots averaged more than the slower shots. A surprising number came at the rim before the defense was organized. Mekonen's methods and findings.
I can't honestly tell you the two-for-one is a stupid tactic after reading that. There is evidence it works. And his study listed Boston among the better teams at converting these chances.
That still leaves a coaching question. The study is a one-season league sample, not a randomized experiment and not the Celtics' three-year possession ledger. Teams sometimes shoot early because they see a good opportunity. You can't assume that forcing a terrible shot produces the same benefit. The useful investigation would compare the two teams' points and shot quality across every relevant sequence, then separate good execution from rushed nonsense.
I haven't completed that Boston-specific three-year audit, and I'm not going to pretend the numbers exist in my notebook. What I do know is that “the clock says shoot” shouldn't be the last bit of thinking that happens on a possession. Study methodology.
Brad Stevens didn't remember the quote. Fans probably do.
After Philadelphia eliminated Boston, Brad Stevens was asked about the three-point obsession and Mazzulla's old remark. His response was that he didn't remember the quote. He then offered a perfectly sensible explanation: not all threes are equal, an open kick-out is good, a hard contested three instead of a better available action isn't.
I agree with him. Completely. Which is why I find the exchange so aggravating.
Stevens is president of basketball operations. He helps build the team, choose the personnel and evaluate the coach. He can't be the kindly bystander when the system he supports gets exposed in the playoffs. If he believes the Celtics need more ways to generate quality shots, what has he done about it? Which players were acquired for that purpose? Which decisions are changing? Stevens' May 2026 comments.
The maddening part isn't that a front office likes modern basketball. Every successful front office does. It's that a reasonable question about specific failures too often becomes a discussion of broad principles. Fans didn't watch a principle lose two 20-point leads to New York. They watched a basketball team do it.
If I get one question with Mazzulla, it isn't “Do you still believe in threes?” Of course he does. It's this: When the Knicks took away your good looks in those fourth quarters, tell me the first counter you called, the second one you tried, and why neither worked.
And Stevens can answer the next one: If the coach couldn't create the alternatives you say were needed, how are you holding the operation accountable?
I can live with a team missing shots. I have a much harder time living with a team that appears to run out of ideas.
— PEL
This column draws on published game records, commentary and a league-wide two-for-one study. The Celtics' full 2023–26 play-by-play two-for-one results were not independently reconstructed for this piece.